A quantitative model of technology transfer and technological "catch-up" by Raz, Baruch et al.
wJ
,'.' £4.
PU; .Ao
I
I
0007
A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
AND TECHNOLOGICAL
"CATCH-UP"
Baruch Raz
Gerald Steinberg
Andrew Ruina
CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OFTECHNOLOGY
Cambridge, Mamschustts 02139
11111
I
4m~2371
I
I
C/82-3
A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TECHNOLOGICAL "CATCH-UP"
Baruch Raz
Arms Control and Defense Policy Studies Group
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and
Gerald Steinberg
Arms Control and Defense Policy Studies Group
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and
Andrew Ruina
Department of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics
Cornell University
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
September 1982
I
Abstract
This article presents a quantitative model for the analysis of
technological development and technology transfer. The rates of development
of technological leaders and followers are expressed in terms of coupled
equations. On the basis of this model, comparative development rates and the
dynamics of the gap between leader and follower are analyzed. The usefulness
of this approach is then demonstrated in the analysis of the development of
mainframe computers in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the nature of the
"technological gap" are assessed quantitatively.
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A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TECHNOLOGICAL "CATCH-UP"
I. Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Technology and technological gaps between states are seen to be of
fundamental importance in the second half of the 20th century. These gaps are
perceived as the sources of international economic disparities and of
differences in military power. Technology is a central focus of the dialogue
between the advanced industrialized world (the North) and the industrializing
countries (the South).1 It is also seen as a major factor in the assessment
of the military balance between the US and USSR. According to the dominant
view, while the USSR may have deployed more weapons and men than the US, this
imbalance is offset by American qualitative superiority resulting from
technological leadership.2
Recognition of the centrality of these technological disparities has
naturally led to efforts to diminish, close, or even reverse them. The
process of technological development in such "follower" countries can, in a
broad sense, be attributed to a combination of the mobilization of internally
accessible resources and the transfer of technology from external sources.
The precise nature of the link between these aspects of technological
development varies according to country, sector, and specific technology. For
example, Japan has been very successful in absorbing foreign technology and
building on that base through the efficient allocation of internal
resources. 3 , 4 Other countries are widely considered to have difficulties
absorbing transferred technology to a level of product quality comparable to
that of the source country.5 While this is generally true for
non-industrialized states, it is also apparently the case for some countries
as relatively developed as the USSR.
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The importance of technology transfer to the economic and military
capabilities of the USSR has led to a major policy debate in the US. Since
the Cold War, the US has attempted to restrict the export of critical
technologies to the Soviet Union. Export control laws were established and
licenses required in these areas. In addition, the US pursuaded its NATO
allies and Japan to participate in this effort. An informal group known as
the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was created to provide a
forum in which uniform policies for technology transfer could be
developed. 6 In the past decade, however, these structures have been subject
to attack from a variety of perspectives. For some, the policies were
becoming increasingly porous, allowing the USSR to obtain forei.gn technology
through a variety of "unplugged leaks".7 On the other hand, those with an
interest in the Soviet market have argued that such restrictions are of. little
significance in the wake of growing Soviet technological progress, and simply
deprive the firms of business. Some political analysts have also argued that
the free-flow of technology creates an interdependent relationship which
limits conflict and forces the USSR to "think twice" before undertaking
political initiatives which might interrupt the flow of this technology.
According to this view, limits on technolgy transfer will merely encourage the
USSR to develop their own capabilities in these areas. 8
These criticisms have led to a number of new studies and efforts to assess
US policy in this area, and have resulted in a variety of policy prescriptions
aimed at minimizing the transfer of "sensitive" technology to the USSR. The
prescriptions range from a broad prohibition on the transfer of products,
processes, or know how to specific efforts to identify the most sensitive and
unavailable technologies on which to focus. 9
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The wide variation of perspectives and policy prescriptions can be
attributed, in large part, to the general lack of understanding of the links
between indigenous technological development and technology transfer. Most of
the evaluations of this link are impressionistic, or at best, are based on a
few well known case studies. Analysts speak of technological gaps in terms of
years between the US and USSR levels of proficiency, or of the US as being
"one or two generations ahead". Such assessments are ambiguous, at best, are
generally highly impressionistic, and do not form a solid foundation for
analysis and policy formation. To date, quantitative analyses of the rate of
technological development and the role of technology transfer have been
lacking. Such quantitative analyses, however, are would be useful in the
development of a systematic and well grounded policy for technology transfer.
There has been a long standing recognition of the possible utility of a
quantitative measure of transferred technology. An early attempt was made by
G. Foster and N. Nissenoff, who used a technological index to "rank...the
technology being transferred and that being practiced in the host
country." 10 This approach has been regarded as fruitful by its authors but
it does suffer from a number of severe limitations:
(a) The index used by Foster and Nissenoff consists of a linear
combination of six factors whose values are based entirely on the
estimates of a panel of experts. They are combined without weighting.
(b) There is no time evolution built into Foster and Nissenoff's
algorithm. It is not useful in forecasting changes in the ability of
a specific country to absorb transferred technology.
Other work on the quantitative aspects of technological development has
been focused on the dynamics of technological substitution. This work,
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however, is not directly applicable to the analysis of technology transfer.
This contribution has recently been reviewed Linstone and Sahal 11
A recent work by M.N. Sharif and K.M.A. Haq presents a model for
technology transfer in terms of spacial diffusion and the potential for
technology transfer between countries.12 They use classical material
diffusion formalism to describe the diffusion of technology. They also equate
differences in technological levels with the diffusion driving potential.
While interesting, this analogy between the process of technology transfer and
classical diffusion is not demonstrated in a convincing manner. Sharif and
Haq demonstrate their approach with an example related to the diffusion of
computer technology. To measure the degree of assimilation of computer
technology in a given country they use the total installed computer memory in
this country. This parameter is problematic in our view because: (a) It is
extensive (dependent on the size of the system, like volume), while we regard
technology as an intensive variable, (independent of system size, as in the
case of temperature); (b) It does not reflect modern computer architecture,
in which other factors such as operating speed and time sharing are of great
significance.
In this paper, we shall present a semi-empirical, quantitative model of
technological "catch-up" which relates the behaviors of the technological
leader and followers. The behavior of the follower nation(s) is described by
differential equations which relate the rates of progress of leaders and
followers to their present levels of achievement and to the technological gap
between them. These coupled equations are solved to yield a generalized
analytic solution for the level of proficiency of the follower as a function
-5-
of time in terms of some initial levels of technology for the leader and
follower, and constants describing the indigenous rates of development for
both and the rate of technology transfer between them.
While this model incorporates a number of simplifying assumptions that are
discussed below, it can be used as a first approximation to describe the
behavior of leaders and followers and to assess the rate constants. We begin
this assessment by exploring various classes of behavior which apply to
different situations and distinct relationships between the indigenous rate
constants and the rate of technology transfer. On this basis, we illustrate
the model through a comparison of the evolution of US and Soviet main-frame
computers over 25 years and calculate the rate constants in this case. As
will be demonstrated, the general model is found to be applicable to this case
and is useful in analyzing the nature of the technological gap in this area.
II. Conceptual Development of the Model
As many studies have shown, technological development in general follows a
logistic curve.13 This curve, first proposed by the demographer Raymond
Pearl in the 19th century, follows a trace best described by the letter "S".
The logistic curve describes exponential growth, which is constrained by a
limit over which it cannot grow. The limit may be physical like the speed of
light, or may consist of economic or social constraints, as were apparent in
the case of air transport and the SST. At the beginning, a logistic curve is
essentially identical to an exponential curve. As the technology advances,
however, the curve begins to deviate from the exponential. The extent to this
deviation increases, and in the final stage, the curve assymptotically
approaches the established limit for development. In other words, the
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development of a given technology begins slowly and the curve is rather
flat.(Fig. 1) After a short period of time, the level of proficiency
increases more and more rapidly. In the third stage, the physical limits of
the technology are neared, or the market is saturated, and the evolution slows
again.
In analyzing technological development and transfer, there is usually a
clear distinction between the technological "leaders" and the technological
"followers". 14  For any particular technology, the leaders, by definition,
are the first to develop and market the innovation and to make improvements in
the technology.
The follower states, (or firms, in a domestic context), in turn, develop
or otherwise acquire the same technology later than the leaders, often using
concepts, personnel or components supplied by the leaders. Ideas and methods
developed externally can provide the follower with a basic direction and
"proof of concept" for internal development, and publications often provide
details. Specific components and machinery imported from abroad can create
the foundations for indigenous development, or can supply the few basic pieces
in the process which are not internally available.
Perhaps most importantly, the physical movement of people provides a great
deal of expertise. Students and trained professionals can gain "hands on
experience" in foreign labs and enterprises and experts from the leader states
and firms are often available to provide assistance. 15 These various
contributions can come through legal channels or less orthodox paths, but the
objective is the same. Regardless of the path and source, during the learning
phase, each form of technology transfer is expected to aid development.
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By definition, the technological followers start later or, as happens in
many cases, their indigenous development capabilities are initially much more
limited than that of the leader. Thus, the initial growth rates are slower.
While external sources of technology may exist and be available, the follower
usually lacks the infrastructure necessary to absorb and exploit this
potential. There may be insufficient trained personnel to comprehend the
available material, or essential resources or skills may be lacking. (For
example, the blueprints for aircraft engine manufacture are widely available,
but the necessary materials and skills to produce the parts are scarce.)
As the level of technological capability increases, however, the follower
begins to"catch up" with the leader, and the gap between them may be reduced,
(unless the leader has gone to a new technology and thus begun the process
again). During this stage, technology transfer is likely to be of greatest
importance. As the gap decreases, the role of technology transfer is again
reduced. There is little to learn from external sources, and the rate of
development is largely determined by the nature of the technology and the
availability of indigenous resources.
In summary, then, the role of technology transfer for a follower country
can be described in terms of three phases:
*The initial phase, in which development is slow compared to that of the
leader and the absorptive capacity for technology transfer is too limited
to allow a high rate of progress;
*The "learning" phase, in which the rate of development is much greater
and depends both on the indigenous resources, the gap between leader and
follower, and the rate of technology transfer;
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*The third phase, in which the gap is reduced or closed and the role of
technology transfer is again reduced. (In many cases, this phase is far
out in the future. There are, however, some notable exceptions, as in the
case of Japan, S. Korea, Israel, and other intensively innovating states.)
A Quantitative Formulation of the Model
In attempting to assess and analyze the role of technology transfer, a
number of specific questions are in order. Perhaps the most important concern
the degree to which technology transfer can assist the rate of development of
the follower country in a specific technology. In most cases, for example,
there is evidence that transferred technology contributes in a significant
manner to the rate of development. When the technology is close to its
pre-ordained limits and the leader relinquishes its efforts to innovate in
this technology, the follower can close the gap, and even overtake the
leader. (Case a, figure 2) In other cases, however, the potential to
transfer the same technology has little impact on the rate of development.
The gap between leader and follower increases despite technology transfer
(Case b).
The purpose of this section is to develop a quantitative method for
comparing the rates of development of the leader and follower, to allow for an
evaluation of these and related issues.
As noted above, it is assumed that the leader develops in a manner
independent of the follower. Technological proficiency may be measured by
some quantity P. Use of P in a quantitative model would not be sensible,
however, since any function of P might just as well have been used and would
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change the model properties. We introduce a dimensionless measure x, that is,
some function of P;
x = f(P) (1)
so that
dxL/dt = kL (2a)
or XL(t) X + kLt (2b)
for the leader. Thus, we are assuming that there is some measure of
technology that increases linearly in time for a leading (or decoupled)
country. The development of the follower must be measured in a similar form,
though this will not, of necessity, imply a linear increase with time for XF
(technological know-how) of the follower. From equations 1 and 2, we can
conclude that the simplest function representation of the connection between
the measures X and P is
x =ln P (2c)
This is consistent with emprical evidence that technological proficiency P
evolves exponentially.*
*This presentation of the problem does not incorporate the effects of
physical limits to development. It is, thus, appropriate to apply it
only at the first stages of growth.
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The rate of technological progress of the follower consists of two
contributions:
dxF/dt= KF + fl(XF) f2(XL, XF) Eq.3
The first contribution, kF, represents the indigenous development
of the follower and the second contribution represents that of technology
transfer. In many cases, kF is significantly less than the second
transfer term and progress is thus dependent on the gap between leader
and follower. As the gap decreases, the contribution of technology
transfer would logically become less significant, while for large gaps,
the follower has a large reservoir from which to draw.
The functions fl(xF) and f2(XL, XF) are generalized
functions implying a dependence of the follower's rate of progress on his
technological proficiency in the field and on the gap between him and the
leader. In this case, the simplest form is
f2(xL, XF) = (XL - XF) Eq.4
We choose fl(xF) to be a dual-valued function, such that for
small xF, it is zero, but when xF has crossed a particular
threshhold, it is a constant, kT. For example, an indusrialized state
such as Japan is able to pursue a given technology once a decision has
been made to do so, but a less industrialized state may not have the
capability even to absorb available technology. Until this capability is
developed, the value of the function fl is zero.
This functional form of fl(xF) is consistent with empirical
experience. For countries with little technological development of their
own, there is almost nothing they can absorb in the form of technology
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transfer. Once they have gained a minimal amount of knowledge, (the
threshhold point), however, they can begin to absorb this externally
developed component.
Now we can solve Eq. 2-4 for xF as follows:
dF/dt = kF + kT(XL-XF) Eq.5
dF/dt + kTxF= kF + kTxL Eq.6
We know that x -AO +k
Lx L kLt from Eq. 2c and plugging this in,
we find that:
dxF/dt + kTXF= kF + kTX + kTkLt Eq.7
This is an inhomogenous linear differential equation. The general
solution to the entire equation consists of a general solution xH to
the homogenous equation (righthand side equals zero) plus any particular
solution xP to the entire, nonhonogenous equation. Thus,
xF = xP + xH Eq.8
The solution to the homogenous equation is:
H = Ce-kTt
where C is a constant of integration. We can also assume that a
particular solution will have the same form as the solution for the
leader. Thus,
xp = A + Bt Eq.9
Plugging this into Eq. 2-8, we find that
B + kTA + kTBt = kF + kTX + kTkLt Eq.10
Matching constant and first-order terms in time, we find:
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B = kL Eq.ll
(kF-kL)/kT + X Eq.12
Thus, the development of the follower as a function of time is:
XF(t) =(kF-kL)/kT + xO + kLt + CekTt Eq.13
To solve for the constant of integration, C we use an initial
condition. At t=O:
XF() =0 and C=xP - x0 - (kF-kL)/kT Eq.14
Finally, this yields the following analytic solution:
XF(t) =x + kLt - (kL-kF)/KT
- [XLO - XFO) - (kL-kF)/kT] e-kTt Eq.15
(initial gap) (final gap)
The form of this solution reminds one of other cases of coupled
dynamic behavoir. The first line of the solution represents the "steady
state" solution, for large t, and the second line is the transient
solution, which may be important for smaller time spans. In considering
the steady-state portion, we note that the first two terms,
Xo +kL kLt represent the progress of the leader, xL(t). The
remaining term, (kF-kL)/kT represents the "steady state" gap
between leader and follower. It is important to note that the gap does
not necessarily vanish for large t. This conforms with observed behavior
and is consistent with the assumption that the leader maintains a
constant effort to develop new technology, as represented in Eq.l. The
gap
G = xL -xF Eq.16
= (kL-kF)/kT + [(xL-x)(kL-kF)/kT]&kTt
final gap transient
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When the initial levels are equal, as is frequently the case, the "steady
state" solution for large t is
Ginfinity=(kL-kF)/kT Eq.17
In brief, we assume a measure of technology proficiency X so that for
the leader
dL/dt = kL Eq.18
and for the follower
dxF/dt = kF + kT(XL-XF) Eq.19
The constants KL and KF measure the two countries' intrinsic
learning rates and KT the transfer coefficient. These equations have
the solution
XL(t) = X+ kLt
XF(t) = xL(t) - Ginf. -(Go -Ginf.)e-kTt
Eq.20
Eq.21
where Go = x0 -XO (the initial gap)
and Ginf. = (kL -kF)/kT (the eventual gap)
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Discussion
Prior to the analysis of a single case, it is useful to examine the
application of this model in a series of general cases. Different forms
of generalized behavior can be illustrated by examining the relative
rates of technological development which are associated with varying
values of KL, KF and KT- (The reader should note that KL, KF
and KT are in units of years~1 . In Figure 3, we compare the effects
of KL and KF on the technological gap assuming that the initial gap
is zero. One can distinguish between two general cases; when the
indigenous rates of development of leader and follower are relatively
similar (KL = KF) and when the leader's development is much greater
than than of the follower (KL> >KF)- (A third case, in which the
follower's rate is greater than that of the leader, is possible, but in-
this case, the follower would eventually become the leader and is thus
included in the first case. A more detailed analysis of this third case
will be presented in a subsequent paper.)
In cases where the indigenous rates of development are similar, so
that the rate of the leader is only marginally greater than that of the
follower, the asymptotic level of the gap is relatively small.
In contrast, when the indigenous rate of development of the follower
is significantly smaller than that of the leader, the gap grows much more
rapidly at the beginning and the "steady state" gap is far larger than
that in the previous case. For example, for a fixed kT (rate of
transfer) and a given kL = .5 yr-1 , values of KF = .4 yr-1 and
kF = .2 yr-1 yield very different size gaps. For the lower level of
indigenous development, the gap opens quickly and reaches a level which
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is over a factor of 2.5 greater than that for KF = .4 yr-I in 25
years. For large times, that gap exceeds a factor of 3.
This distinction may be useful in constrasting the behavior of the
advanced industrial states, such as Japan, with the behavior of states
with a smaller indigenous technological capability, such as the USSR. In
the former case, the gap rapidly reaches its asymptotic value, which
isrelatively small. (A more complex version of this model, which would
include the tendency of the leader to diminish his effort and for
technology to reach a maturity embodied in physical limits, would
demonstrate technological catch-up in this case.) For the case of a
small kF, the gap is relatively larger and takes longer to reach a
steady state.
The rate through which the technological gap changes is very
sensitive to the value of KT, the rate constant for technology
transfer. For a given kL and kF, different values of kT result in
various types of behavior (Figure 3). For a relatively high value of
kT the gap reaches a fixed and relatively low level in a short period
of tine. For kL = .5 yr-1 , kF = .2 yr-1, as in the case of US
and Soviet computer development discussed below, the gap reaches about
two thirds of its "steady state" value in six years when kT = .2
yr-1 . When kT = .06, this value is not reached until 20 years have
passed, and the "steady state" gap is over 3 times as great as when
kT = .2 yr-1 . For a kT = .02 the "steady state" gap is 10 times
greater than for kT = .2 yr-1 . In other words, the relative rate of
technology transfer, as measured in kT, has a major effect on the gap,
as is apparent in eq. 2-17.
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Example: An Analysis of Soviet Computer Development
In order to illustrate the value of the algorithm discussed above in
assessing technological development, we have chosen to analyze the
development of main frame computers in the USSR. This example is of
particular importance as the issues of electronics and computers are
central to many of the analysis and policy debates concerning East-West
technology transfer. Opponents of such transfers note that any addition
to Soviet equipment or knowledge, no matter how obsolete in terms of the
U.S., will be exploited by the Soviet military. 16 Much of the debate
hinges on the relative rates of progress of computer development, and is
thus an example of the type of issue which appears amenable to the
quantitative analysis proposed in this study.
In analyzing the development of digital computer technology in the
USSR relative to that of the US, we are also taking advantage of the fact
that the USSR has chosen a "follower" strategy. As Goodman 17 and
others 18 have pointed out, the Soviet Union began research and
development in this area at the same time as the US, and in the early
1950s, had a very similar capability. During the next two decades, a
significant gap grew as indigenous development proceeded very slowly in
the USSR while the US digital computer industry developed very rapidly in
response to commercial as well as military demand.
By 1967, however, the result of continued indigenous effort and
transferred technology were beginning to become apparent. Emphasis was
placed on the emulation of proven US designs and products. In
particular, since that time, Soviet computers have been closely modelled
upon IBM main frame systems. The Ryad I and II follow the IBM 360 and
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370 series very closely, and the rate at which the gap had been
increasing began to decline. Thus, the leader-follower model on which we
have the quantitative approach presented above should be useful in
analyzing this case.
Results
A full analysis of comparative computer development in the US and
USSR is beyond the scope of this study. In the first place, comparasion
depends on the definition of figures of merit through which relative
performance can be assessed. In anything as complex as a main-frame
computer, such assessment may require analysis of components,
architecture, input/output systems, and software. In addition, the
application of the system is of importance. For example, for the
solution of coupled differential equations central to the design of
nuclear weapons, the speed of floating-point operations are critical.
For cryptography, rapid manipulation of data is central, and a computer
which is optimized for the former is unlikely to also be optimized for
the latter task. A very important descriptive effort comparing US and
Soviet computers in great detail has been undertaken by Goodman, et
al.19
In order to illustrate the model, we have chosen a single parameter P
by which to compare US and Soviet computer development. Our choice is
the number of operations per second (ops) of which a given computer is
capable. (Other measures, such as the power/delay factor, mean-time
between failuires (MTBF), or cost per instruction, were considered, but
data for these factors in both the US and USSR was not readily
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available. In addition, the ops measure is similar to the "processing
data rate" (PDR) used by the US government and the COCOM countries to
compare computer capabilities. Thus, this figure of merit provides data
is relatively parallel to that used in the context of debates over the
transfer of computer technolgy to the USSR.)20
For the US, the rate of development displays, an exponential growth
pattern for P. Thus, using X = ln P we will satisfy our linear growth
requirement for X. According to the data collected by Knight 21 and
presented in Figure 4, between 1952 and 1975, the number of operations
per second of main-frame computers in the US grew by a surprisingly
constant factor of approximately 1.6 per year.
In the USSR, computer development can be traced between 1955 and 1980
through the Ural, Besm, Ryad I and Ryad II series. In examining the -
number of operations per second in these systems as a function of time,
we see a changing trend (Figure 4). Between 1955 and the mid-1960's, the
growth curve was relatively flat. In the late 1960's, however, the rate
accelerated.
Despite the relatively crude measure of development which we have
selected, the development of Soviet computer technology as measured by
the growth in the number of operations of per second, follows the model
presented above remarkably closely. The "leader-follower" behavior is
quite apparent, and as expected, the initial rate of development of the
USSR, as measured by the value of the rate constant KF, is less than
half that of the US. For the U.S., we have calculated a KL of
.5 yr-1 , while for the USSR, KF = .2 yr~I. This relatively small
value of kF reflects a limited Soviet indigenous capability in this
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area, and a relatively undeveloped technological base and infrastructure
which produced the BESM and URAL series of computers.
In the process of accruing knowledge and gaining access to external
technology, the capabilty has grown rapidly. The development curve is
much steeper than was apparent during the earlier phase, when transferred
technology played a significantly lesser role. For this case, we
calculate by curve fitting a value of KT = .06 yr~l for the constant
describing the rate of technology transfer.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a particular quantitative model of
technology transfer and the relationship between leader and follower, and
we have demonstrated that this particular approach is useful in
describing observed behavior in this important area. The brief analysis
of the comparative development of Soviet and US computer development, and
Figure 4 in particular, serve to demonstrate the validity of the
quantitative approach presented above.
A complete exploration of the insights provided by the model will
require detailed analyses in a variety of cases involving different
technologies and different countries. However, some preliminary
implications are suggested in the case of US and Soviet computer
development which we have examined. In particular, we observe that the
behavior of the USSR is consistent with that of a technological
follower. We also note that the indigenous capability is limited but
significant in the area of computer development.
At the same time, we note that the gap could also potentially be
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increased if the US were to increase its own rate of innovation in this
area (i.e., increase KL)- Accelerating the appearance of new
generations of technology, such as VHSIC (very high speed integrated
circuits) could potentially contibute to this objective. While the
complete embargo of such technology is very costly and difficult to
achieve, this approach raises the cost of "catch-up" for the follower and
allows the leader to increase the size of the gap.
This problem and the broader questions of policy prescription also
serve to indicate some of the limitations of the model we have
presented. As noted above, we do not specifically include the third
stage of technological development in which the technology has matured
and the physical or market-based barriers become dominant. In the
computer area as a whole, this stage has apparently not yet been reached,
but in the sub-area of VLSI, for example, there are indications of
physical limits which prevent continuous growth. The importance of these
limits await investigation in further quantitative analyses of the
problem of technological development and transfer.
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1: Stages in the development of technological proficiency.
Fig. 2: Comparison of the development of technological proficiency of a
leader with two types of followers. Case (a): A follower with
high indigenous learning capability. Case (b): A follower with
a relatively low indigenous learning capability.
Fig. 3: Relative effects of the different rate constants on the dynamics
of the technological gap and on the steady state value.
Fig. 4: Development of computer main frames in the US( 21 ) and in the
USSR(17-19) (In thousands of operations/sec. vs. time)
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